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INTRODUCTION

Sometimes easy cases make bad law — or at least might make bad
law. The Supreme Court is currently considering granting certiorari in
New Hampshire v. Massachusetts. 1 At issue is the State of New
Hampshire’s (and its amici’s) claim that Massachusetts’s insistence on
applying its income tax to residents of New Hampshire, who once
commuted to work for businesses in Massachusetts but now remotely
work for those businesses in New Hampshire because of the COVID19 pandemic, violates the Due Process Clause and dormant Commerce

*

Many thanks to Nestor Davidson, Brad Joondeph, Alan Morrison, Dan Rodriguez,
Erin Scharff, Christine Kim, and all the participants in the Fordham Urban Law
Journal’s 2020 Cooper-Walsh Colloquium. I also want to thank the editors of the
Fordham Urban Law Journal for exceptional editing. All mistakes are my own.
1. New Hampshire v. Massachusetts, SCOTUSBLOG [hereinafter SCOTUSBLOG],
https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/new-hampshire-v-massachusetts/
[https://perma.cc/F8YY-RC3X] (last visited Mar. 12, 2021).
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Clause.2 The claim is simple and seductive: if these New Hampshire
residents barely leave their own homes, much less their state, how can
it accord with due process for Massachusetts to tax them?
This simple analysis, however, should be rejected because it would
be applying an old economy heuristic (you earn where you physically
are) to a new economy problem (work can happen in many places). If
the Supreme Court agrees to hear this case (and I think it should not),
and if it were to hold in favor of New Hampshire (and I argue in this
Essay that it should not), it would deal a severe and almost comically
mistimed blow to the modern urban economy by undermining the
ability of central urban areas to impose income taxes on an increasingly
mobile workforce.3
This Essay proceeds in three parts. Part I provides background
about the current lawsuit as well as the policy and doctrinal issues it
raises. Part II argues why Massachusetts’s arguments against the
taxation of remote workers are incorrect as a matter of constitutional
law. Part III acknowledges that current state law regarding the
sourcing of employee income is not ideal from a policy perspective and
suggests an old solution to this relatively new problem: apportionment
by formula. In this context, apportionment means achieving a
reasonable division as to a matter in which there is no clear right
answer. In the case of a remote employee living in one state but
working remotely in an agglomeration of talent made possible by
another state, this Part argues that the right answer is that both states
have some reasonable claim to a portion of that worker’s income.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Lawsuit: New Hampshire v. Massachusetts

As of the time of writing this Essay, New Hampshire has asked the
Supreme Court to exercise original jurisdiction over its claim that
Massachusetts regulators’ choice to treat no-longer commuting New
Hampshire residents as Massachusetts employees violates the Due
Process Clause and dormant Commerce Clause.4 The Supreme Court
has called for the U.S. Solicitor General’s view on the matter.5

2. See Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint at 1–2, New Hampshire v.
Massachusetts, No. 220154 (Oct. 19, 2020) [hereinafter New Hampshire Complaint].
3. See Erin Scharff, Cities on Their Own: Local Revenue When Federalism Fails,
48 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 919 (2021) (explaining the importance of having multiple broad
tax bases).
4. See New Hampshire Complaint, supra note 2, at 23–24.
5. See SCOTUSBLOG, supra note 1.
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On a procedural level, the case faces many challenges, including
whether New Hampshire has standing and whether this is the right case
at the right stage of development for the Court to exercise original
jurisdiction.6 I am inclined to agree with Massachusetts that this is not
a case the Court should hear,7 but I will leave those arguments to one
side and consider the merits of the case in this Essay. It is worth getting
to the merits because New Hampshire and its many amici are surely
right that the basic issues here are important and unlikely to go away.8
In particular, this case presents the questions of when and how much a
state can tax remote employees. New Hampshire and its amici argue
that New Hampshire residents who have not worked in Massachusetts
since March 2020 should not be subject to Massachusetts’s personal
income tax.
B. Agglomeration Economics

On its face, one might think this fight is a battle between states.
States are the sovereigns imposing these income taxes, and it is states
that are given the privilege of asking for the Court’s original
jurisdiction. This case, however, is about cities — or, at least, the
proper resolution of the case requires thinking about cities. This is not
because the dormant Commerce Clause applies differently to cities.9
Rather, it is because thinking about cities provides the answer to the
question of whether a state like Massachusetts is entitled to tax these
remote workers.
One might question why Massachusetts is taxing New Hampshire
residents who have not been in the state for months and are not likely
to come back for months, but the puzzle here is something of an optical
illusion. Many of New Hampshire’s residents are clustered around the
border of Massachusetts because of its proximity to Boston.10 From
6. See Brief in Opposition to Motion for Leave to File Complaint at 11–12, New
Hampshire v. Massachusetts, No. 220154 (Dec. 11, 2020).
7. Even Steve Wlodychak, a prominent commentator who agrees with New
Hampshire, does not think that the Court will or should take the case. See generally
Steve Wlodychak, New Hampshire v. Massachusetts: Wrong Court, Right Case, 99
TAX NOTES ST. 107 (2021).
8. For a list of New Hampshire’s amici curiae, see SCOTUSBLOG, supra note 1.
9. See Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 504 U.S.
353, 361 (1992).
10. See KENNETH JOHNSON, CARSEY INST., NEW HAMPSHIRE DEMOGRAPHIC
TRENDS
IN
THE
TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY
5
(2012),
https://scholars.unh.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1163&context=carsey
[https://perma.cc/4VMD-CYKV]; Byron Lutz, Quasi-Experimental Evidence on the
Connection Between Property Taxes and Residential Capital Investment, 7 AM. ECON.
J. 300, 317 (2015); see also New Hampshire Complaint, supra note 2, at 59–60.
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the perspective of real economic units, these New Hampshire residents
are functionally residents of the greater Boston metropolitan area. It
is not surprising or odd that the Boston metropolitan area would want
to tax residents, even if those residents technically live in a different
state.
But why are these residents of New Hampshire paying higher
housing prices to live near Boston? 11 Not so very long ago, the
dominant economic model of local jurisdictions featured people and
businesses shopping among competing jurisdictions for the best deal —
the best set of amenities at the best price. 12 This is the so-called
Tiebout model, 13 and there is some evidence that “homevoters” do
behave in this way.14 To give a classic example, homebuyers will often
be very aware of the quality of local public schools and will pay more
— or less — for a home based on the perceived qualities of the schools
in a given school district.15
When New Hampshire complains in the current suit that it has an
“advantage” because it does not levy an income tax — an advantage
that Massachusetts undermines — it is in effect stating that it is
engaging in Tiebout-type competition with the rest of the Boston
metropolitan area.16 However, armed with only the Tiebout model, it
is odd that so many people are clustered together and paying high
housing prices around Boston, whether with income taxes or not. And,
even more peculiarly, these New Hampshire residents were not so
hostile to state income taxes that, at least until the pandemic, they were
commuting into Massachusetts and incurring a state personal income
tax. The Tiebout model cannot explain this behavior. Considering
11. See Lutz, supra note 10, at 300.
12. See David Schleicher, Local Government Law’s “Law and ___” Problem, 40
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1951, 1958 (2013) (reviewing literature).
13. For the seminal article on the topic, see Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of
Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 416 (1956). See also Darien Shanske, Above

All Else Stop Digging: Local Government Law as a (Partial) Cause of (and Solution
to) the Current Housing Crisis, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 663, 672–73 (2010) (providing

additional discussion and context of the Tiebout model).
14. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES
INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE
POLICIES (2001) (amassing evidence for the Tiebout model); see also Richard Briffault,
Our Localism: Part II — Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 405–06,
416–17 (1990).
15. See, e.g., Michele Lerner, School Quality Has a Mighty Influence on
Neighborhood Choice, Home Values, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/realestate/school-quality-has-a-mighty-influenceon-neighborhood-choice-home-values/2015/09/03/826c289a-46ad-11e5-8ab4c73967a143d3_story.html [https://perma.cc/ST3C-5PR9].
16. See New Hampshire Complaint, supra note 2, at 15.
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only housing prices, given there is no income tax anywhere in New
Hampshire, why are so many residents of New Hampshire paying more
to live near Massachusetts?
The newer economic models revolve around the benefits of
agglomeration — of bunching together. Density in businesses,
especially similar types of businesses, can be a big positive, especially
for the flow of ideas.17 If, for example, a person works as a software
engineer, then it makes sense to live near a thriving software industry.
This is good not only for obtaining a job to begin with but to sharpen
skills, hire other employees, and network to obtain one’s next job.
Thus, the answer to the riddle of the cluster around the border of
Massachusetts: there is an agglomeration of talent in the Boston area
that these workers benefit from.
Agglomeration economics is an essential tool for explaining why
metropolitan areas exist at all, and, though the types of agglomeration
might change in the future, it seems doubtful that its benefits will ever
completely go away. 18 I acknowledge that this is something of
conjecture. If agglomerations were ever not to matter, or not matter
very much, then the analysis that followed might be different, at least
as a policy matter.
It turns out that major agglomerations have often not followed state
or interstate lines. While this has led to a variety of governance issues
that should generally prompt reconsideration of several constitutional
doctrines and of how the federal government should regulate interstate
taxation, a greater discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this
Essay. Instead, this Essay questions whether the Supreme Court
should address the issue of increased remote work by imposing a new
physical presence rule. That such a rule is not advisable is made
apparent by the example of agglomerations that cross state lines — that
is the very case before the Court. If there were such a rule, then a
software engineer in the greater Boston area who lives in New
Hampshire could carefully avoid some physical presence threshold as
to Massachusetts, and thus avoid paying personal income tax to the
primary jurisdiction enabling that worker to earn a high income.
17. See Edward L. Glaeser & Joshua D. Gottlieb, The Wealth of Cities:
Agglomeration Economies and Spatial Equilibrium in the United States, 47 J. ECON.

LITERATURE 983, 1023 (2009) (emphasizing information spillovers); Daniel B.
Rodriguez & David Schleicher, The Location Market, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 637,
641–43 (2012) (summarizing literature and identifying three benefits of agglomeration:
reduced transportation costs, larger market size, and information spillovers).
18. See Jeffrey D. Sachs, Jerry Seinfeld Is Right About New York’s Future, CNN
(Aug. 30, 2020, 10:21 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/27/opinions/jerry-seinfeldright-about-new-york-sachs/index.html [https://perma.cc/HE53-7M2G].
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The Supreme Court excised a similar physical presence rule in a 2018
case called South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.19 For the 50 years prior to
Wayfair, the Court had held that only remote vendors with a physical
presence in a state could be forced to collect the use tax on behalf of
the state. Now, the post-Wayfair rule dictates that any business with a
substantial economic presence in the state can be forced to collect the
use tax. A similar standard should, and does, govern whether a state
can impose an income tax.
C. Doctrine

When a state imposes a tax, the tax can be challenged on numerous
constitutional grounds. The most important ones — and the primary
ones relied on in New Hampshire v. Massachusetts — involve the Due
Process Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause. The Due Process
Clause “‘requires some definite link, some minimum connection,
between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax,’
and that the ‘income attributed to the State for tax purposes must be
rationally related to values connected with the taxing State.’”20 Since
1992, due process has not required that a taxpayer be physically present
in a state. 21 New Hampshire and its amici assert, however, that
Massachusetts’s claim to the income of formerly non-remote
employees does not even satisfy the requirements of the Due Process
Clause.
Derived from Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, the dormant
Commerce Clause subjects a state tax to a four-part test: (1) a state can
only impose a tax on an activity with which it has a substantial nexus,
(2) the tax must be fairly apportioned, (3) the tax must not discriminate
against out-of-state taxpayers, and (4) the tax must have a fair relation
to state services. 22 In this case, only two prongs are particularly
relevant — (1) substantial nexus and (2) fair apportionment. First,
regarding the substantial nexus, the Court in Wayfair declared that it
Rather, some
would no longer require physical presence. 23
combination of economic and virtual contacts could suffice.24

19. See 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018).
20. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 306 (1992) (citations omitted)
(quoting Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344–45 (1954); and then quoting
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 273 (1978)), overruled in part by Wayfair, 138
S. Ct. at 2099.
21. See id. at 307.
22. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
23. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099.
24. See id.
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Second, regarding fair apportionment, the basic idea is that a state
can only tax a reasonable share of the income of an interstate
enterprise, and thus it may not (a) in effect, tax income earned
elsewhere or otherwise (b) overtax or overburden interstate
businesses.25 For example, consider Apple. California and New York
can tax Apple because it is a major multistate business with substantial
economic presence in both states. Assume both states have a 5%
corporate income tax and Apple has $100 billion in income. If both
California and New York tax Apple on all of its income, then Apple’s
income will be taxed twice. In other words, some states will necessarily
be taxing income earned out of state if all the income of an interstate
business is being taxed multiple times. Imagine all 50 states imposed
such a tax on all of Apple’s income — that would be 5% * $100bn * 50
= $250bn — $250 billion in taxes on $100 billion in total income.
Apportionment is needed to ensure Apple’s $100 billion income is
reasonably divided among the states.
States first encountered the problem of taxing large multijurisdictional businesses with the railroad industry in the nineteenth
century. The states argued that the pieces of property occupied by
railroad tracks were part of a larger, unified system that was very
valuable. In turn, railroads argued that their property value was
minimal because they just owned a little bit of land, wood, and iron
stakes. The Supreme Court agreed with the states. 26 Thus, the
“unitary business principle” was born, permitting states to consider
that they are taxing a unitary business even if the value or income of
that business is earned in several states.
Acceptance of the unitary business principle immediately led to
another conundrum, namely, how to divide up the value or income of
a unitary business. The Supreme Court adopted a flexible rule
permitting any reasonable formula and placed the burden on the
taxpayer to “prove by ‘clear and cogent evidence’ that the income
attributed to the State is in fact ‘out of all appropriate proportions to
the business transacted in that State.’”27 Thus, in the case of railroads,
a state could apportion the value of a railroad on the basis of the
percentage of tracks in the state.

25. See generally Bradley W. Joondeph, The Meaning of Fair Apportionment and
the Prohibition on Extraterritorial State Taxation, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 149 (2002).
26. See Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U.S. 194, 228–29 (1897);
State R. Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575, 611–12 (1875); In re Del. R.R. Tax, 85 U.S. 206, 219–

20 (1873).
27. Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 170 (1983) (quoting Hans
Rees’ Sons v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123, 135 (1931)).
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This permissibility as to formulas is appropriate for several
reasons.28 First, for a unitary business, locating the exact source of its
income or value is difficult, if not impossible. Where is the value of an
interstate railroad? The great stations are worthless without humble
tracks crossing great distances with nothing around. Second, state tax
bases are often opaque — and deliberately so — which makes it
difficult to identify the tax base to be apportioned. As an example,
consider Texas’s Margin Tax.29 The tax base of the Texas Margin Tax
is determined by using one of four methods of calculation, whichever
method results in a lower margin: (1) permitting a deduction of total
gross revenue by 30%, (2) a deduction of $1 million, (3) a deduction by
costs of goods sold, or (4) a deduction by employee compensation.30
To the extent this tax is measured by 30% of gross receipts, it is a gross
receipts tax. To the extent this tax is measured by a deduction for the
cost of goods sold for some taxpayers, it is more a type of income tax.
Therefore, the Texas Margin Tax, unlike a traditional income tax or
property tax, is not targeted towards one type of value. The tax surely
needs to be apportioned — and it is — by proportion of sales within
the state; this measure, however, is very rough because the underlying
value that Texas is trying to tax a fair proportion of is protean. If the
apportionment rule needs to hew closely to the underlying theory of
the tax, the problem would not simply be about creating endless work
for economists and lawyers (the classic railroad problem), but that the
underlying tax base is hard to quantify even without the problem of
interstate apportionment. But the states are allowed to levy
complicated, hybrid taxes. Thus, a reasonable attempt by a state to tax
only its fair share should and does suffice.
One final aspect of current doctrine is important. There are two
principles on which a government can impose a tax: residence (where
one lives) and source (where one earns income). Thus, for example,
California can tax a person on all of her income, including the rental
property she might own in New York, because she is a resident. New
York can also tax the same person on that rental income. In order to
avoid double taxation on the rental income, the national and
international norm is that the jurisdiction of residence grants a credit
to the resident taxpayers for taxes paid to the source jurisdiction.

28. See generally Joondeph, supra note 25.
29. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.106(a) (West 2018).
30. See id.
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As a matter of federal constitutional law, taxing according to both
principles is well established.31 Federal constitutional law does not,
however, prescribe a rule of priority between residence and source.32
What federal constitutional law does is impose a rule called “internal
consistency,”33 which means a state cannot choose a tax structure that,
if universally copied, would result in double taxation. So, a state can
tax only on the basis of residence or source because, if every state did
so, then interstate taxpayers would be no worse off.34 Once a state
taxes on the basis of residence and source, then the state must give
credits (unless it is going to tax its own residents who earn income instate twice), as they essentially all do, and prioritize the source
jurisdiction, which all states do.
Both New York and New Jersey impose income taxes that follow
this basic structure. As a result, when a New Jersey resident commutes
to New York, that employee is taxed by New York (source) first. New
Jersey, as the resident state, then gets to tax its resident on the same
income but gives a credit for paying taxes to New York. If New York
taxes are as high or higher than New Jersey taxes, then New Jersey
effectively gets no personal income tax revenue from these residents.
New Jersey has joined New Hampshire as an amicus in the current
litigation, arguing that New York’s apportionment rule violates the
Due Process Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause. 35
Specifically, New Jersey argues that New York’s longstanding rule for
assessing whether an employee is a resident in the state, the
“convenience of the employer test,” is unconstitutional because it has
the effect of sourcing the income of remote workers to New York.36
31. See, e.g., New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 312–13 (1937)
(recognizing the principle of taxing according to residence); Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S.
37, 51 (1920) (recognizing the principle of taxing according to source).
32. See Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1803–05
(2015).
33. Id. at 1804.
34. See generally Bradley W. Joondeph, The States’ Multiple Taxation of Personal
Income, 71 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 121 (2020).
35. Brief for States of New Jersey et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiff at
5–6, New Hampshire v. Massachusetts, No. 220154 (Dec. 22, 2020).
36. See id. For a more in-depth discussion of this test, see infra Part II. Note that
there is a separate question as to whether this is how the New York test should be
interpreted to operate during the COVID-19 pandemic. See Walter Hellerstein,

Nonresident NY Employees Are Not Currently Working at Home for Their
‘Convenience,’ TAX NOTES (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.taxnotes.com/featured-

analysis/nonresident-ny-employees-are-not-currently-working-home-theirconvenience/2020/04/02/2cbx8 [https://perma.cc/7MGV-4RHC]. The fact that the New
York test might not even have the purportedly unconstitutional effect is another
reason the Court should not take this case.
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II. MISTAKEN CONTENTIONS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE AND ITS AMICI

New Hampshire and its amici make two primary contentions. First,
they argue that the Massachusetts regulation is unconstitutional
because it asserts nexus under the Due Process Clause and dormant
Commerce Clause on taxpayers who are not residents in the state and
whose income is only sourced to the state because of their employers’
location.37 Second, they argue that the tax is unconstitutional under
the Due Process Clause and dormant Commerce Clause because it is
not fairly apportioned.38
New Hampshire and its amici’s arguments regarding the nexus are
mistaken.39 The Supreme Court held 29 years ago in Quill that physical
presence is not required for nexus under the Due Process Clause,40 and
it held three years ago in Wayfair that physical presence is also not
required for nexus under the dormant Commerce Clause. 41
Accordingly, under current law, a business can incur the liability to
collect the use tax with as little as $100,000 in sales made within a
state. 42 It is hard to understand why an employee who formerly
worked full-time out of an office in Boston does not continue to have
nexus with Massachusetts sufficient to pay a tax if that employee is
working remotely for a Massachusetts employer on account of a public
health emergency. To be sure, there is a different question if the
employee were never to return to commuting, but that is not the
question in this case.
And the move from physical presence was, and is, the right move.
As all the Justices agreed in Wayfair, it was never a constitutional
requirement to base nexus to tax on physical presence, and, as the
majority in Wayfair emphasized, this heuristic was particularly

37. See New Hampshire Complaint, supra note 2, at 91.
38. See id. at 92.
39. The main state and local tax treatise arrives at a similar, if not more tentative,
conclusion about the requirement of physical presence for nexus. See WALTER
HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION § 20.05, at 12 (3d ed. 2020). Note that the same treatise
is skeptical of the New York rule and believes it requires apportionment. See id. At
the level of policy, I think this is correct, but I disagree that this is required as a matter
of law. See discussion supra Part I.
40. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 308 (1992).
41. See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018).
42. For another interesting parallel, see International Harvester Co. v. Wisconsin
Department of Taxation, 322 U.S. 435, 441 (1944). There, the Court explained that
“[p]ersonal presence within the state of the stockholder-taxpayers is not essential to
the constitutional levy of a tax taken out of so much of the corporation’s Wisconsin
earnings as is distributed to them.” Id. at 441. If out-of-state shareholders can be taxed
on income reasonably sourced to a state, then why should out-of-state employees not
be so taxed?
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problematic in the age of the internet. 43 Wayfair was a case about
collection of the use tax by businesses, but the same logic holds for
individuals. If virtual contacts suffice for nexus for a business, what is
the warrant for a physical presence rule for individuals as matter of
constitutional law? And so there are important differences between
individuals and businesses of course, and one might quite reasonably
argue that residence is more important for individuals. 44 Yet the
question is whether those differences are of sufficient weight to be
made into a constitutional principle. I think these differences are not
because that would, in effect, be to deny that a state may assert nexus
based on the lessons of aggregation economics. To make the point
another way, New Hampshire and its amici are likely right that there is
going to be more remote work in the future, but this means it is all the
more important that a tax nexus not be entwined with an outdated
understanding of where and how work happens. If more work is to be
done remotely in the future, then it is all the more important that
physical presence not be made a constitutional bright line rule again.
Agglomeration economics addresses the underlying intuition that it
is not fair to tax someone who is not physically present or not present
full time. Cities are enabling the agglomerations of talent and capital
that make it possible for earning to happen in these metropolitan areas,
especially for those with higher salaries. This is even more true when
state lines happen to cut through a metropolitan area. It is one thing
for a remote worker in Montana to challenge the Massachusetts or
New York rules,45 but the residents in New Hampshire and New Jersey
are, in fact, typically living in the Boston and New York metropolitan
areas.
New Hampshire and its amici’s second argument as to
apportionment presents trickier questions. The first step is to return
to the two basic grounds for taxation: residence and source. States with
income taxes can tax all of the income of their residents but give a
credit for tax paid on income earned with a source in another state.
States will then tax non-residents on their in-state source income.

43. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2095 (“A virtual showroom can show far more
inventory, in far more detail, and with greater opportunities for consumer and seller
interaction than might be possible for local stores. Yet the continuous and pervasive
virtual presence of retailers today is, under Quill, simply irrelevant. This Court should
not maintain a rule that ignores these substantial virtual connections to the State.”).
44. See generally Young Ran (Christine) Kim, Taxing Teleworkers, 55 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. (forthcoming 2021).
45. And to be clear, I think the source states do have a claim on the income of a
worker in Montana, just a lesser one. See discussion infra Part III for thoughts on how
to administer the tax in this case.
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There is no question that Massachusetts, as the source state, cannot tax
the employees on all of their income; it can only tax their income with
a source in the state.46
Does Massachusetts’s apportionment rule fail the (appropriately)
flexible standard for apportionment? It seems not. Until the beginning
of March 2020, few people, if anyone, challenged the idea that the state
in which an employee worked can tax all of that employee’s income as
sourced to the state because those services were physically performed
in the state. It seems reasonable for Massachusetts to assume that it
remains the source for the length of the pandemic because those
workers will return. They will return because of the reason they were
there to begin with — these workers (and their employers) benefit by
being located next to similar workers. To the extent that some workers
will not return, then at some point, they will not be Massachusetts
employees anymore, but Massachusetts does not have to assume that
none will return.47
But, as to both the nexus and apportionment questions, one might
ask how far this can go. Suppose a New Hampshire resident never
returns to work in Massachusetts even after the pandemic is over.
Surely, at some point, Massachusetts cannot tax the employee, right?
The answer is yes and no. On the one hand, there is a point at which
Massachusetts cannot tax a remotely working New Hampshire resident
employed by a Massachusetts taxpayer as if that employee commuted
into Massachusetts every day. There would need to be some other rule
used to test whether the nexus is sufficient and, if so, to measure the
resulting share of income apportioned to Massachusetts. New York’s
convenience of the employer test is such an apportionment rule.48 The
New York rule asks if the worker is not at her employer’s location for
the employer’s convenience. If the answer is “no,” then, for the day in
question, the income is apportioned to New York.
But how much of nexus is sufficient for purposes of the Due Process
Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause? I have no bright line rule
to propose, just as there is no bright line rule for other nexus and
related jurisdictional questions. If an individual is, in a conventional
sense, based out of an office located in a state, even if the individual
never sets foot in that state, that state should have nexus. Consider a
junior lawyer working remotely. At least for now, there will likely be
46. Formally, New York’s convenience of the employer test is an apportionment
rule for source income.
47. And again, to be clear, if they become permanent remote workers, then
Massachusetts still has a claim under some circumstances.
48. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 132.18(a) (1995).
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a place in physical space that contains more of the lawyer’s supervisors,
co-workers, and support staff than any other place. The state that
contains that space, at least, has nexus because of the employee’s
substantial virtual presence in the state.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL DOES NOT MEAN OPTIMAL: OTHER OPTIONS

As discussed supra, the current constitutional rules are correct, and
the current New York and Massachusetts rules are constitutional under
those rules. Indeed, the New York rule is better than those of many
other states that rely on physical presence precisely because it does
not.49 Nevertheless, the New York approach may not necessarily be
the best as a matter of policy.
Consider the following not-so-hypothetical and only somewhat
stylized scenarios. In the first scenario, Google opens up a new office
in New York that only has space for 100 employees.50 Google, in fact,
has 100 employees who regularly come to the office, and they are all
commuters from New Jersey. Under the current regime, New York is
the source for all that income, and, in effect, New Jersey will receive
very little income tax from these residents even though New Jersey has
a reasonable claim to tax a substantial portion of that income.
In the second scenario, suppose this New York Google office hires
100 entirely remote employees. If they are considered fully remote,
and as such their location is at the convenience of the employer, then
New York will receive no income tax at all from these new employees
— even though, as explained at the outset, the logic of agglomeration
indicates that New York does have a claim to tax some of that income.
In the third scenario, suppose Google adds 25 office spaces in New
York and 100 employees who are formally based out of the New York
office, with the expectation that each of the remote employees come to
the office about 25% of the time. In this scenario, there would likely
be a battle over whether New York can tax these employees at all (the
taxpayers’ presumable position) or whether New York can tax all of
their income (perhaps New York’s position). A different approach —

49. See Ellen S. Brody & Cory M. Paul, In Defense of the “Convenience of the
Employer”
Test,
12
COLUM.
J.
TAX
L.
(2020),

https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/taxlaw/announcement/view/350
[https://perma.cc/EWV8-XCZU].
50. See Matthew Haag, Manhattan Emptied Out During the Pandemic. But Big
Tech
Is
Moving
In.,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
9,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/13/nyregion/big-tech-nyc-office-space.html
[https://perma.cc/W4ZE-YTX3].
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which may be how the matter is resolved under current New York law51
— would be that 25% of these remote employees’ income would be
sourced to New York.
Apportioning 25% of the remote workers’ income to New York is
not a perfect solution, to be sure, but it is reasonable — so reasonable
that it makes one wonder about the first two scenarios where
apportionment did not seem to have a role.52 But I think it should.
Returning to the second scenario, it seems that New York has some
claim to the income that remote employees earn through taking
advantage of New York’s agglomerations. An apportionment solution
would seem appropriate here, and evolving law and practice involving
the corporate income tax suggests how this might be implemented.53 I
am assuming that some agglomeration will continue, and thus large
multistate employers will have agglomerations of employees. 54 For
example, if Google were to have 10% of its workforce in New York and
then have a certain number of permanently remote employees
reporting to multiple offices, then apportioning 10% of the remote
employee’s income to New York seems reasonable and appropriate.55

51. See OFF. OF TAX POL’Y ANALYSIS TECH. SERVS. DIV., N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF
TAX’N & FIN., NEW YORK TAX TREATMENT OF NONRESIDENTS AND PART-YEAR
RESIDENTS APPLICATION OF THE CONVENIENCE OF THE EMPLOYER TEST TO
TELECOMMUTERS AND OTHERS (2006).
52. Apportionment is currently standard in special cases, such as athletes. See
Timothy P. Noonan & Doran J. Gittelman, Taxing Times to Be a Telecommuter:
Convenience Rules During COVID-19, TAX NOTES ST. (Sept. 17, 2020),
https://www.taxnotes.com/featured-analysis/taxing-times-be-telecommuterconvenience-rules-during-covid-19/2020/09/17/2cyh2 [https://perma.cc/YB3S-XD9H].
53. This proposal is similar to and inspired by one Ed Zelinsky made. See generally
Edward A. Zelinsky, Apportioning State Personal Income Taxes to Eliminate the

Double Taxation of Dual Residents: Thoughts Provoked by the Proposed Minnesota
Snowbird Tax, 15 FLA. TAX REV. 533 (2014). However, Zelinsky proposed to use

apportionment to divide up residence, not source — as for source, he seemed to believe
a physical presence rule is required. He submitted an amicus brief on behalf of New
Hampshire. See Brief of Professor Edward A. Zelinsky as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint, New Hampshire v.
Massachusetts, No. 220154 (Dec. 10, 2020); see also SCOTUSBLOG, supra note 1.
54. In fact, a collateral benefit of re-thinking the sourcing rules could be to
encourage de-agglomeration. After all, before the pandemic and recession, there was
great concern about too much concentration in large urban areas.
55. See MULTISTATE TAX COMM’N, MODEL GENERAL ALLOCATION &
APPORTIONMENT REGULATIONS WITH AMENDMENTS SUBMITTED FOR ADOPTION BY
COMMISSION 80–81 (2017), https://www.mtc.gov/getattachment/EventsTHE
Training/2017/Special-Meeting/FINAL-APPROVED-2017-Proposed-Amendmentsto-General-Allocation-and-Apportionment-Regulat.pdf.aspx
[https://perma.cc/A9VY-W7WY] (regulating and apportioning income based on
proportion of payroll). There is a certain circularity here given that it is known where
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The same is true for the first scenario. The operation of the
residence principle under current law is paradoxical. On the one hand,
the resident state can tax a resident on all of her income, which seems
like quite a lot, and likely more than can be justified from a God’s eye
view (does no other state contribute anything?).56 Yet the source rule
typically also attributes 100% of income to the source, again more than
can be justified from a God’s eye view. And thus, the norm that each
state gives tax credits as to taxes paid to the source state means that the
resident state often gets very little. In the current litigation, we could
re-characterize New Jersey’s position as saying “enough is enough” —
it is one thing for New York to get first crack at the income of physical
commuters, but too much to also get first crack at the income of
workers who are temporarily working remotely. This complaint makes
sense as a matter of policy, though, as already explained, it is not
persuasive as a matter of constitutional law.57
Now, as to the first scenario, there is a question of how to apportion
the income of commuters. A first step is to consider what would
happen if there were one metropolitan area government covering New
York and New Jersey — that government would be entitled to tax
100% of the employee’s income. What to do if there are two
governments? One very rough solution would be to split the income
50–50, 58 though a lot of other divisions could be defended. For
instance, perhaps the source jurisdiction should get two-thirds of the

some employees are located — hence it is crucial for this proposal that agglomerations
continue, if perhaps in different forms and locations.
56. In a sense, this winner-takes-all source rule is another example of the flexibility
of the command that a tax be apportioned. The Court has long accepted that the sales
tax need not be apportioned. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S.
175, 186 (1995) (“We have . . . consistently approved taxation of sales without any
division of the tax base among different States . . . .”). The Court’s position can be
understood on two related grounds. First, the Court understands the pragmatic
difficulties the state would encounter as to apportioning some forms of income.
Second, because of the widespread use of credits, this seeming violation of the
apportionment principle does not offend against the core value the Court is concerned
about: non-discrimination against interstate commerce. See Joondeph, supra note 25,
at 181–82.
57. Another way of putting this Essay’s constitutional argument would be that if
apportionment were required in this case, then it would call into question other areas,
like the sales tax, where the Court has relaxed the apportionment requirement when
there is no discrimination. See supra text accompanying note 55.
58. In Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, the Supreme Court approved the
exercise of limited extra-jurisdictional authority by a city over a neighboring
unincorporated community against an Equal Protection Clause challenge. See 438 U.S.
60, 61–63 (1978). Note that as part of the Court’s approved structure, those subjected
to extra-jurisdictional authority still needed to pay fees to the city, but at half the rate
of city residents.
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income based on the argument that the residence jurisdiction can also
levy a property tax to pay for local services.
New Jersey currently taxes commuters into New Jersey on all of
their source income, and so benefits from the same rule that costs it
revenue. But even if New Jersey moved to an apportionment regime,
this would not help New Jersey taxpayers unless New York did so as
well. This collective action problem does not mean that the Court
needs to put its thumb on the scale in this murky area. Rather, the
Court needs to allow states to negotiate and, ideally, prompt
congressional action.59 Neither is wholly impossible. As to the states
acting, consider for example that it is not clear if New York will lose
from a shift to an apportionment regime of the type outlined above if
current trends continue. It is precisely because of this veil of ignorance,
i.e., it being unclear which jurisdictions will do better and which will do
worse, that the states might be amenable to moving to an
apportionment regime themselves or accepting a broad apportionment
regime imposed by Congress. If the Court imposes a physical presence
rule, particularly one based on due process, then such development
would be impossible.60
CONCLUSION: THE COURT SHOULD NOT DICTATE A RULE

At the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the
twentieth, the courts needed to adjust to the rise of large multistate
enterprises. How does one reasonably tax a railroad? The notion of
dividing up the enterprise’s income by formula was new, but it worked
and was upheld. States already tax individuals on the basis of days
worked in one state or another. It will require another shift to

59. Developing what Congress should do is beyond the scope of this Essay, though
I think a uniform apportionment approach is the proper reform. Congress certainly
should not itself impose a new physical presence test, as current proposals before
Congress would. See American Workers, Families, and Employers Assistance Act, S.
4318, 116th Cong. (2020) (broader relief bill); Remote and Mobile Worker Relief Act
of 2020, S. 3995, 116th Cong. (2020) (remote worker bill).
60. In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, the Court ruled for the taxpayer but only on
dormant Commerce Clause grounds, which gave Congress the chance to craft a
different (better) rule. See 504 U.S. 298 (1992). Despite repeated attempts, Congress
could not do so because of divisions between the states and different industry groups.
It seems very likely that the same veto points would have the same effect (not
legislation) if the Court again looks to Congress to fix its mistakes. The difference
between ruling for New Hampshire in this case on the dormant Commerce Clause and
maintaining current law and ruling against New Hampshire is that once New
Hampshire and its amici win, then there will be no need for many states to negotiate
further. Under the current regime, every state is both a potential winner and loser and
hence the possibility of progress.
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understand when and how states can fairly and reasonably tax workers
who are virtually present in one state or another. In this Essay, I have
not argued exactly what this new regime should look like. Rather, I
have argued that the courts — and especially the Supreme Court —
should not hamper the emergence of this solution by imposing a novel
physical presence requirement on the taxation of individual income.

